Peer Firm Financial Reporting Behavior During and After Aggressive Financial Reporting Within Their Industry

dc.contributor.advisorNwaeze, Emeka
dc.contributor.advisorYin, Jennifer
dc.contributor.authorTurner, Michael C.
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLopez, Dennis
dc.contributor.committeeMemberMiller, Stewart
dc.creator.orcidhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-8714-057X
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-08T16:00:31Z
dc.date.available2024-03-08T16:00:31Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.descriptionThis item is available only to currently enrolled UTSA students, faculty or staff. To download, navigate to Log In in the top right-hand corner of this screen, then select Log in with my UTSA ID.
dc.description.abstractIn the United States, numerous examples exist of SEC registrants engaging in aggressive financial reporting. These instances often attract the attention of stockholders and regulators, as evidenced in existing research investigating the consequences of indulging in aggressive financial reporting. In addition to known cases of aggressive financial reporting, numerous examples exist of non-enforced firms engaging in aggressive accounting practices. However, it is unclear if the peer firms (those firms not directly involved in the nefarious accounting activities) respond to aggressive accounting by mirroring or ignoring such behavior. Additionally, when the enforcer is active within their industry, it is unclear if peer firms alter their accounting practices in hopes to avoid attracting the regulator's attention, or if the peers take the position that their financial reporting is according to GAAP and, therefore, there is no perceived risk of an imminent investigation into their respective firms. Using a unique set of data, I analyze peer firm behavior before, during, and after an industry firm engages in aggressive accounting practices. The findings suggest that peer firms trade a decrease in earnings management via discretionary accruals for an increase in real earnings management when an aggressive firm ceases its aggressive financial reporting. Further, the evidence reveals that the knowledge of SEC enforcement activity in a Peer Firm's industry is the greatest motivator to report lower earnings management, both via discretionary accruals and real earnings management.
dc.description.departmentAccounting
dc.format.extent124 pages
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.isbn9780438300491
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12588/5985
dc.languageen
dc.subjectEarnings Management
dc.subjectRegulation
dc.subject.classificationAccounting
dc.titlePeer Firm Financial Reporting Behavior During and After Aggressive Financial Reporting Within Their Industry
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.dcmiText
dcterms.accessRightspq_closed
thesis.degree.departmentAccounting
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Texas at San Antonio
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy

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