The Ascending Problem for Kane: Ultimate Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, Self-Forming Actions, and Incompatibilist Freedom

Date
2021
Authors
Chavarria, Phillip J.
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Abstract

This thesis provides a critical analysis of Robert Kane's account of Free Will and Responsibility he presents in his book The Significance of Free Will. Kane's views on the conceptual relationships between Ultimate Responsibility, the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, Self-Forming Actions and Incompatibilism will be explored, as his arguments for a kind of free will that is incompatible with determinism are reconstructed and evaluated. The aim of this thesis is to show that Kane's incompatibilist account of free will is not coherent, nor are his arguments for this account sufficient for establishing the conclusion that indeterminism is required for an agent to have free will.

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Keywords
Alternative Possibilities, Compatibilism, Free Will, Incompatibilism, Philosophy of Action, Responsibility
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Department
Philosophy