Almeida, MichaelAnderson, Aaron Morgan2024-01-262024-01-2620229798358490499https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12588/2522This item is available only to currently enrolled UTSA students, faculty or staff. To download, navigate to Log In in the top right-hand corner of this screen, then select Log in with my UTSA ID.This thesis is divided into two distinct missions: one negative mission and one affirmative mission. The negative mission precedes the affirmative and is devoted to arguing against the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), Galen Strawson's Basic Argument, and Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. The positive mission argues for the following six criterion: S's action x is free and morally responsible in circumstances C if and only if (i) S's performing x in C is a means to the achievement of a goal G, (ii) S wills G, (iii) S has participated in a sound practical syllogism according to which S ought to perform x in C if S wills G, (iv) S knows, truly and justifiably believes, or truly intuits that S ought to achieve G (the end) in C & S knows, truly and justifiably believes, or truly intuits that S ought to perform x in C to achieve G (the means), (v) S performs x in C because performing x is in accordance with practical reason, and (vi) S is rationally disposed in the actual causal sequence to perform x as suggested by (i-v).63 pagesapplication/pdfAristotleCompatibilismDeterminismFree WillReason Viewvan InwagenPhilosophyThesis