Evil is not evidence
| dc.contributor.author | Almeida, Michael | |
| dc.creator.orcid | 0000-0002-7257-4236 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-04-26T21:23:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-04-26T21:23:55Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2022-03-24 | |
| dc.description.abstract | The article aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of affairs in any possible world constitutes any non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. There might well be states of affairs in some worlds describing extraordinary goods and extraordinary evils, but it is false that these states of affairs constitute any (non-trivial) evidence for or against the existence of God. The epistemological and metaphysical consequences for philosophical theology of assuming that S4 or Kσρ is the logic of metaphysical necessity are equally untenable. S4 guarantees that God does not exist if there is the slightest evidence against the existence of God. And Kσρ guarantees that God might survive the loss or acquisition of any essential property at all. | en_US |
| dc.description.department | Philosophy and Classics | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 1469-901X | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12588/854 | |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Religious Studies; | |
| dc.rights | Attribution 3.0 United States | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/ | * |
| dc.subject | problem of evil | en_US |
| dc.subject | evidence | en_US |
| dc.subject | metaphysical necessity | en_US |
| dc.subject | traditional God | en_US |
| dc.title | Evil is not evidence | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |